University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Other Publications
1914

Editorial Preface to This Volume
Joseph H. Drake

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/other/153

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/other
Part of the Law and Philosophy Commons, and the Legal History Commons

Faculty Scholarship

THE FORMAL BASES
OF LAW
BY

GIORGIO DEL VECCHIO
Professor of Philosophy of Law in the University of Bologna

TRANSLATED

BY

JOHN LISLE
of the PhiladelphiaBar

WITH AN EDITORIAL PREFACE BY

JOSEPH H. DRAKE
Professor of Law in the University of Michigan
AND

WITH

INTRODUJCTIONS

BY

SIR JOHN MACDONELL
Professor of ComparativeLaw in University College, London
AND

SHEPARD BARCLAY
Former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Missouri

First Published 1914
(Boston: The Boston Book Company)
Reprinted 1969
By Arrangement with the Macmillan Company

EDITORIAL PREFACE TO THIS VOLUME
By JOSEPH H.

I.

DRAKE'

The Author and the Translator.

GIORGIO DEL VECCHIO (born at Bologna, August 26,
1878) studied at the universities of Genoa, Rome and
Berlin, obtaining in the University of Genoa his doctor's
degree in the philosophy of law. In the year 1903 he
was nominated professor of that subject in the University
of Ferrara, where he began his teaching with the discourse
"Right and Human Personality in the History of
Thought." He occupied that chair till the end of 1906,
giving also a course of lectures as docent in the University
of Bologna during the years 1905 and 1906. In 1906 he
was nominated for the professorate of the philosophy of
law in the University of Sassari and remained there until
the end of 1909. To this period belong, among others, the
dissertation on "The Phenomenon of War and the Idea
of Peace," which was read originally at the University
of Sassari as an inaugural address of an academic year.
In 1909 Del Vecchio was called to teach in the University of Messina, which at that time was being reestablished after the fatal earthquake of 1908. He was
appointed in the first group of professors who offered
themselves for the work of reconstruction, which had
at that time a high moral and civil significance. From
Messina, Del Vecchio returned finally at the beginning
I Professor of Law in the University of Michigan, and member
of the Editorial Committee for this series.
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of the year 1911. In this year he was nominated professor in the University of Bologna. He began his teaching
in this university, where he still teaches, with the discourse "Upon Positivity as a Quality of Law."
Del Vecchio has participated in various international
scientific congresses. Among others was the International Congress of Philosophy at Heidelberg, in the
year 1908, reading there an article, "Upon the Conception of a Science of Universal Comparative Law."
This has been published in Italian, German, French,
Spanish, Portuguese and Roumanian. He belonged
from the beginning to the "International Vereinigung
fir Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie" of Berlin, and
represented Italy in the honorable council of that society.
He likewise was a member from the beginning of the
"Society of J. J. Rousseau," in Geneva, and he has had
similar share in many scientific bodies, e. g., "The
Academy of Science of the Institute of Bologna," "The
Accademia Peloritana of Messina," and others. He
has the title of Professor Honorarius of the University
of Ferrara, and is Corresponding Member of the National
Committee for the History of the Italian Renaissance.
Several of his works have had the purpose, aside from
that of translation, of communication to a foreign
academy, as for example, the essay "Upon the Theory
of the Social Contract" which was presented by the
philosopher Emile Boutroux to the Institute of France
(Academie des Sciences Morales et Politiques) at the
sitting of July 20, 1907.
The translation presented in this volume in three
parts was published in Italian in three separate volumes:
the first appearing in 1905, under the title of "The Philosophical Presuppositions of the Idea of Law"; the second,
in 1906, under the title of "The Concept of Law"; the
third, in 1908, under the title of "The Concept of Nature
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and the Principle of Law." "The Formal Bases of Law"
has been chosen as the title for these combined volumes
2
which form one connected work.
2

The other published works of the author are:

1. "L'evoluzione dell' ospitalitA" (in "Rivista italiana di Sociologia," A. VI, Fasc. II-III). Roma, 1902.
2. Giordano Bruno (in "Rivista ligure," A. XXIV, Fasc. III).
Genova, 1902.
3. "I sentimento giuridico" (in "Rivista italiana per le scienze
giuridiche," Vol. XXXIII, Fasc. III). Torino, 1902. Seconda
edizione, 1908.
4. "L'etica evoluzionista." Nota critica (in "Rivista italiana
di Sociologia," A. VI, Fasc. V-VI). Roma, 1903.
5. "La Dichiarazione dei diritti dell' uomo e del cittadino nella
rivoluzione francese."
Genova, 1903.
6. "Diritto e personalith umana nella storia del pensiero" (in
"Rivista di Filosofia e scienze affini," A. VI, Vol. I, N. 3). Bologna,
1904.
7. "Il comunismo giuridico del Fichte." Nota critica (in
"Rivista italiana di Sociologia," A. IX, Fasc. 1). Roma, 1905.
8. "Su la teoria del contratto sociale." Bologna, 1906.
9. "Sull' idea di una scienza del diritto universale comparato"
(in "Bericht fiber den III Internationalen Kongress fur Philosophie"),
Heidelberg, 1909. Seconda edizione, Torino, 1909.
10. "Un punto controverso nella storia delle dottrine politiche."
Nota critica (in "Rivista italiana di Sociologia," A. XIII, Fasc.
V-VI). Roma, 1909.
11. "Il fenomeno della guerra e l'idea della pace." Sassari, 1909.
Seconda edizione (in "Rivista di diritto internazionale," A. V, Fasc.
I-II), Torino, 1911.
12. "Tra ilBurlamachi e il Rousseau." Nota critica (in "CuItura contemporanea," A. II, N. 4). Ortona a Mare, 1910.
13. "La comunicabilith del diritto e le idee del Vico" (in "La
Critica," A. IX, Fasc. I). Trani, 1911.
14. "Sulla positivitA come carattere del diritto" (in "Rivista di
Filosofia," A. III, Fasc. I). Modena, 1911.
15. "Sui caratteri fondamentali della filosofia politica del Rousseau" (in "Rivista ligure," A. XXXIX, Fasc. V). Genova, 1912.
Terza edizione, 1914.
Some of the publications above mentioned have been translated
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The translator of the present volume, JOHN LISLE,
is a graduate of the College and the Law School of the
University of Pennsylvania, and a practitioner at the
Philadelphia Bar. He is also the translator of the works
of Miraglia and Vanni in the present series, and of
Calisse's "History of Italian Law," in the Continental
Legal History Series.
II.

The FormalBases of Law.

In paraphrase of a hackneyed apothegm, it may be
well said that the thinking man is incurably philosophical.
This desire to attain the final reason of things begins at
the dawn of self-consciousness in the individual. Most
of us as college boys experienced this intoxicating philosophic impulse, and the elevation of temperature consequent thereon brought with it an uplift of the spirit
that some of us mistook for the birth of a new intellectual
life. Then we felt we had reached, or at least were in
sight of, an answer to Pilate's question, "What is truth?"
The essence of things, the ultimate reality, was whatever
for our time was the latest style of the "absolute," that something which the thinking man could not help
thinking, which was true for all times and in every place.
This philosophic reality, which was with Plato i8ca,
with Aristotle obtacr-,with Kant the "Ding an Sich,"
with Hegel the "absolute," appears in Roman law as
"jus naturale," in medieval jurisprudence as the law
of nature, and in later juristic thinking as the law of
reason. With each successive emergence of this fundamental concept we seem to have reached the longed for
into various foreign languages: German, Spanish, French, Portuguese, Dutch and Roumanian. "Sulla .positivitA come carattere
del diritto" has been translated into English under the title of
"Positive Right" (cf. "Law Magazine and Review," vol. XXXVIII,
N. 368, May, 1913.)
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finality. But on closer examination we find what is
apparently only the old idea in a new garb, and in our
disappointment we say we will have none of it; philosophy may be valuable as mental gymnastics, but brings
nothing to aid in the solution of the practical problems
of being or of doing.
This philosophic nihilism was characteristic of the best
English juristic thought of the last half of the past
century. The insufficiency of Benthamism and later
types of English utilitarianism as an answer to the basic
question of philosophy was plainly recognized, but the
belief in experience as the only source and test of truth
remained. Nevertheless an aggregate of individual
experiences, no matter how large, can lead us only to
the general, not to the universal, and it is some form of
the universal that the eternal question calls for. Thus
are we thrown back again on the something that transcends experience, that which exists prior to experience
and which makes it possible. "Juridical thought is
anterior to its concrete realization in law," (cf. § 104, in
fine) and to the study of this transcendental concept the
juridical thinkers of the present century have again
turned.
Early in his treatment of the subject, Del Vecchio tells
us that "necessity and universality are elements foreign
to experience but understandable by reason" (§52),
and to reason must we turn for an answer to the philosophic query. This universal element is what he calls
the logical form, "forma dat esse rei," (§55, in fine)
and this logical form, he says, "gives essence not existence." (§ 56.) In this assertion that form is the essence,
we have apparently a reversion to the use of form as
equivalent to the Aristotelian absolute (oto-a&), and as it
is in this sense that the title of our translation uses -1
phrase "formal bases" as a paraphrase of "I presupposti
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filosofici" of the Italian, we may profitably tarry on
some consideration of the philosophic as contrasted with
the popular use of the word "form." That there is a
necessity for some elucidation of this word is self-evident.
Del Vecchio says (§ 81) "no word is understood in
so many ways as the word form"; though he himself
holds consistently to the one connotation, namely, that
form is the metaphysical and "a priori" essence of law,
and the word "formal" has its philosophic meaning
which has prevailed from the time of Aristotle. But
in this sense, meaning "essential," it is the direct antonym
of the popular use of formal, namely, non-essential or
superficial. In this use of the words "form" and
"formal" Del Vecchio is harking back to the oti& of
Aristotle. The concept ovarm (etymologically our
word essence), the ultimate truth of Aristotle's system,
was the analogue of Plato's 18.6. The distinction between the two concepts is for our purpose unimportant.
The philosophic element common to the two is that each
is held to be a true absolute, a truth that comes to us
by virtue of our common intelligence, that which every
man must think as of necessity. The type of this sort
of truth is of course the mathematical axiom, and in the
history of philosophy prior to Plato and Aristotle we
have a mathematical absolute, that of number, in the
philosophy of Pythagoras. When Cicero clothed Greek
philosophy in Roman dress, we find that he used the
word "forma" as a,translation of these Greek absolutes
("De Orat." 10. "has rerum formas appellat i 8 &s Plato
easque gigni negat et ait semper esse ac ratione et
intelligentia contineri").
Medieval philosophy coined two participles from the
classical "esse," namely, "ens" which appears in "entity"
and "essens" from which comes "essential." The word
"essentia" is constantly used throughout the Middle
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Ages as the equivalent of the Aristotelian ota'&, and
appears in modern Romance languages with the same
meaning as in English. It seems therefore that the
primitive meaning of "formal" was "essential," and
this has been preserved in philosophic and juristic
thinking, while the use of "formal" in the popular speech
as the antonym of "essential" is a derivative meaning
and has developed at a comparatively modern period.
III.

Philosophy and Practice.

Pound has shown (22 Yale L. J. 114) how the struggle
for better definition of law has resulted in continually
widening the practical application of law. In like manner it may be shown that the constant broadening of
the metaphysical bases of law has been accompanied
by improvements in its practice, and to this purpose
we may well address ourselves. Supposing then that
the above lucubrations do embody the truth, the question
naturally presents itself, what of it - "cui bono practico?"
Of what avail is philosophic thinking, past or present, for
the busy lawyer or the puzzled judge with his pragmatic
demands for results?
The question is as old as man itself; and philosophy
has been struggling - successfully we may assume for an increasingly better answer to it from the time of
Socrates and the Sophists. Justice, according to the
Sophists, is dependent on a purely arbitrary subjectivity.
What is just for you may be unjust for me. Right on
one side the mountains becomes wrong on the other.
"Yes," says Socrates, "but there is in the community
the ideal of the ethically normal, to which all good citizens should attempt to conform." The laws of the
State embody this ideal, and the just man is he who
obeys the laws of his State. The inadequacy of the
answer appears on its face. But it marks a great advance
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over the negation opposed to it. Each of us is to strive
for a common ideal, and knowledge of this ideal is to
be attained only by individual effort. Government thus
becomes self-government. The end of government is
the welfare of all the citizens and a government of law
and not of men is established.
Plato's service was mainly in his refinement and
development of the doctrine of the "idea." This idea,
or perfect image, of justice is to be found, not as with
Socrates in the average man with all his imperfections,
but in the perfect type of the ethical elect. Although this
narrows the scope of the idea of justice it increases its
intensity, and within this more select circle Plato "recognizes popular conviction, the collective sense of right,
as the source of justice."
In Aristotle we come for the first time upon a fully
developed theory of natural law. Man by his very
nature is a social being and the combination of men
in political bodies forms a natural social unit, the State.
But the concept of State existed prior to its practical
realization, just as the concept of the whole exists prior
to its parts. This natural law is in Aristotle's theory
of jurisprudence the equivalent of the ov'o'x or essence
of his metaphysic; that is to say, it is Aristotle's formulation of the philosophic absolute, the necessary and
unconditioned basis of law. Where is the man of action
who would deny that Aristotle's philosophic theories
have been devoid of practical results? During the Middle
Ages the law of nature, divine in origin, was the only
bulwark for the protection of the nations against the
arbitrary caprice of pope or emperor. In the hands of
Grotius it became the basis of the Law of Nations. In
a perverted form of a return to nature it was made the
justification of all the excesses of the French Revolution,
and one of its fundamental dogmas, that of equality,
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has been incorporated in many modern declarations of
independence and bills of right, which simply reiterate
the Aristotelian principle that "justice is equality." Nor
has this influence been confined to the field of politics
and public law. Sir Frederick Pollock well says that
the law of nature under its modern name of the Law of
Reason is still "the prevailing ideal of which it would
be hardly too much to say that it is the life of the modern
Common Law."
Probably no one is disposed to question the practical
results of the pseudo-philosophic theory of utility as
promulgated by Bentham and elaborated by his followers among the later English Utilitarians. To be sure
it can hardly be classified as a juristic philosophy. It
is rather simply a theory of legislation. But as such
it gave a unifying principle, philosophic in character as
a striving for unity, which constituted the "vis a tergo"
of the reform movement of the last century. However
mechanical or even grotesque the theory of utility was
from a philosophic standpoint, no one can deny that
its application to practical politics has resulted in refashioning large sections of our English law so far as
that can be accomplished through the instrumentality
of legislation.
The metaphysics of law went out of style on the Continent as well as in England in the middle of the last
century. Properly so, we must assume. Savigny was
right and his opponents were wrong. A knowledge of
the detail of the history of European law and a comparison with the laws of other places and periods was
an essential prerequisite to any effort at unification of
legal principles or of any attempt to arrive at the underlying philosophic meaning of law. But philosophy had
her revenge even on the great Savigny. He drove out
the form of natural law with an esoteric content which was
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in style at the beginning of his century. But even
before he had reached the end of his life, philosophy had
reconstructed a new natural law with an historic content
out of the materials gathered by him in the course of
his brilliant historical reconstruction of Roman Law.
With the end of the last century there has come a
revival of idealistic philosophy on the continent. This
has in the main taken the form either of a movement
back to Kant or of a revival and extension of Hegelianism.
Del Vecchio is classed as a Neo-Kantian, and the everyday lawyer may ask of him (as he has of his predecessors)
what contribution he has made to the practical betterment of our complex legal situation.
Kantian philosophy has been described by one of its
modern critics as "the last great uprising of rationalism
in general philosophy and of the doctrine of 'natural
law' in legal philosophy." In the metaphysical system
of Kant the "Ding an Sich" is the modern analogue
of the ovico of Aristotle. Each is a formal concept
existing independently of experience and prior to any
realization in experience. Kant's system of natural law
has been freed from the trammels of the classical theory
of natural law and appears in its modern form of a law
of reason.
It is from this concept that Del Vecchio starts. "The
law of equality of the radii governs before the circle
is drawn." "Whoever builds a house does not thereThese two sentences from
by make its concept."
Chapter X of Part I of this work (§ 77 and § 75) give
the basis of the Kantian theory of law upon which
Del Vecchio builds. It is worthy of note that they both
go back to classical antiquity. The first is even preSocratic, as it involves the concept of number, i. e.,
mathematical truth, which was the Pythagorean absolute.
The second is manifestly the Platonic 184m. The house
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of brick and mortar which appears before our eyes
is not the real house. The true reality is the idea of
house that exists, as Plato says, in the mind of the god.
The circle that we draw is only a copy of the true reality
which is the mathematical concept of curved and continuous line, each point of which is connected by radii
of equal length with the central point. The formal basis
of

law -

here

"formal"

equals "essential" -

is not

found by generalization from any 'number of positive
laws, no matter how large, but is a true universal, existing prior to experience and not conditioned by it.
Del Vecchio gets away from the old natural law over to
the law of reason in his proposition (§ 195) that "the
eternal seed of justice, the foundation of the idea of law
is not furnished by nature considered as the complex
or succession of empirical facts but by the essence (or
nature) of man, which comprehends and transcends
other nature and is in itself autonomous." "The principle of law is therefore deducible 'a priori' from the
nature of man." (Cf. Pt. III, Chaps. IV, V, post.)
What then are the practical bearings of this NeoKantian philosophy of law? First and foremost it is
to be noted that it is true, or at least it possesses more
of truth than do the older natural law theories or than
is to be found in the empirical and positive theories that
it supplants. If it is true, we need hardly go further.
The Lord's truth will take care of itself, and men may
be trusted to find a practical use for it. But we need
not stop with this. The advocates of positive law
assert that the essence of law is force, namely, that it is
an emanation of the sovereign power. The historical
school would apparently confine us to the quietistic
course. We may observe what law has been and is but
can scarcely have an outlook for the future. We must
simply wait on the slow processes of history. But in
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contrast to both of these,"a conception which goes beyond
the phenomenology and empirical determination of
action and finds its principle and norm in the intelligible essence of man" (§ 192) relieves us, on the one
hand, from the dominance of arbitrary force and, on
the other, gives us a hopeful program for the future.
Law is neither force simply nor growth simply, but law
is right reason, existing in the nature of man himself,
and this reasonable law is to be worked out in the experience of mankind by an intelligent prevision tnder the
control of a directive purpose, innate in the reason of
man.
Here is its practical message for us. Possibly it is
not the best formulation of the philosophic reality. The
caustic criticism of some of the Neo-Hegelians, including
their great leader, Kohler, would deny any significance
to it. But surely, as Pollock says, the law cannot
afford to throw away any of its resources. Here we have
a broader formulation of philosophic theories than is
found in any of the juristic predecessors of the NeoKantians, and this theory can be used as a formal basis
from which a practical advance may be made.

